The shifting stance of external actors on Belarus: A political scientist’s 2024 analysis

The geopolitical positioning of Belarus has seen notable shifts in 2024, with key external players adjusting their approaches in ways that could shape the country’s future. While russia remains intent on keeping Belarus within its sphere of influence, the United States has largely disengaged from the issue.

Political scientist Ihar Tyshkevich outlined these dynamics during the presentation of his report, Belarus 2025: Forecast of Political Processes, at the Media Center Ukraine.

“For russia, the priority is to keep Belarus in its orbit for as long and as deeply as possible,” Tyshkevich explained. “moscow is open to all options except waiting for a new political force to emerge. This means russia will remain an active player and will seek to exert influence in any scenario.”

Meanwhile, Belarus is largely absent from Washington’s strategic agenda.

“For the United States, Belarus simply isn’t a priority—it’s not on the map, not in the timeline,” Tyshkevich said. “Washington’s involvement is limited to indirect engagement through its Eastern European partners and concerns about China’s presence in the region. As a result, any scenario that avoids the burden of direct involvement—whether it involves negotiating with Lukashenko, supporting democratization, or even, unfortunately, trading Belarusian independence as part of a broader geopolitical deal—remains acceptable.”

The European Union, Tyshkevich noted, has adopted a dual approach. On one hand, it continues applying pressure on Belarus, acknowledging that its previous policies have yielded little progress. Yet as a whole, the EU remains more reactive than proactive, largely taking a wait-and-see stance.

China’s position, according to the study, is centered on maintaining Belarusian independence, ensuring stability, and ideally resolving tensions with neighboring countries.

For Poland, Belarusian independence is a strategic priority, serving as a buffer between Poland and russia. However, Lithuania’s stance differs significantly.

“In Lithuania’s case, there is a connection to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s circle, though this strategy has seen limited success,” Tyshkevich said. “At the same time, there is another concern—the Lithuanian elite’s fear of so-called ‘Litvinism.’ Unlike Poland, Lithuania appears more willing to tolerate Belarus which functions as a russian proxy. This allows Lithuania to frame russia as a direct threat and justify a unified policy toward both russians and Belarusians.”

As for Türkiye, it is not yet a decisive player in Belarusian affairs, but Tyshkevich predicts that Ankara’s influence will start emerging by the end of 2024 and become more pronounced by 2026.

Regarding Ukraine, the analyst emphasized that while Belarusian independence is important for Kyiv, there is no clear or unified strategy in place.

“As far as I know, at least three different concepts are circulating within Ukraine about how to approach Belarus,” Tyshkevich said. “But let’s be honest—if the country’s political elites themselves cannot agree on a common course of action, then no consistent policy will emerge. Until Ukraine defines its own strategic vision, it will remain more of an observer, unfortunately.”

Read more: https://mediacenter.org.ua/news